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NOTES AND COMMENTS
this stage in the proceedings.70 In addition, the legislature is faced
with the problem of deciding whether to provide for appointed
counsel at the time of arrest.71 Even if no immediate statutory
action is taken, preparation should be made for the possibility of
such a requirement through future Supreme Court decisions.
Roy H. MICHAUX, JR.
Constitutional Law-State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
The State of Washington imposed a tax upon the privilege of
a foreign corporation's doing business in that state,' the tax being
measured by the corporation's gross receipts from sales of motor
vehicles, parts, and accessories to independent retail dealers in Wash-
ington. The taxpayer, General Motors, protested' the tax on the
grounds that it constituted a levy upon the privilege of engaging
in interstate business and thus was repugnant to both the due
process and commerce clauses of the Constitution. Concluding
that "the tax is levied on the incidents of a substantial local busi-
ness,"' the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the tax.
As typifies such a corporate giant in this modem era, the sales
organization maintained by General Motors is complex.4 For pres-
o For a discussion of the amendments proposed in the federal rules to
provide for appointed counsel before the defendant ever sees the judge,
see note 14 supra.
"' See notes 42 & 43 supra and accompanying text for the proposition
that appointed counsel should be provided at the time of arrest in all felony
cases.
I REV. CODE WAsSH. 82.04.270 (1962).
2The Supreme Court of Washington sustained the tax. General Motors
Corp. v. Washington, 60 Wash.2d 862, 376 P.2d 843 (1962).'General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 (1964).
'Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, and General Motors Parts are all sub-
stantially independent "divisions" of the corporation. For sales and admin-
istrative purposes, each "division" is geographically divided into "zones"
which in turn are further sub-divided into "districts." During the period
in question, all "divisions" except General Motors Parts maintained forml
"zone" offices in Portland, Oregon. In Seattle, Washington, was situated
a warehouse operated by the Parts Division and a "branch" office under
the Chevrolet "zone" headquarters. There were no offices at the "district"
level, and the "district managers" operated largely gut of their homes under
the jurisdiction of the Portland office. Their primary functions were to
oversee the dealer organization and to otherwise work with and advise
the dealers in the promotion of sales. It should be noted that these "district
managers" had no authority to accept orders from the dealers; this was a
function performed at the "zone" level. Note also the fact that executive
personnel from the Portland office visited each dealer in the "zone" regular-
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ent purposes, its most interesting aspect lies in the fact that, except
for one branch office of the Chevrolet Division and a warehouse
operated by the Parts Division, the corporation maintained no for-
mal offices in the taxing state. Many of the "District Managers"
of the organization were residents of Washington, but the activities
of these employees were confined to promotional work and acting
as liaison between the far-flung retail dealers and the "zone" office
in Portland, Oregon. Orders from the retail dealers for products,
and the subsequent sales and deliveries to them, were all approved
and handled through the Portland office. Practically speaking then,
the state in imposing its tax on the gross receipts from wholesale
sales made to its citizens was taxing sales that were consummated
entirely outside the state.
In both the due process and commerce clauses of the Constitu-
tion, barriers have been found which preclude certain types of state
taxation of multistate operations. Satisfaction of the due process
strictures requires that the taxing state have some threshold con-
nection with the transaction upon which to base its jurisdiction to
tax. This jurisdictional requirement is met when the state can show
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."5 As stated by
one member of the present Court, this "nexus" between the state
and the taxpayer is "the most fundamental precondition on state
power to tax."' The very essence of a multistate operation, how-
ever, is that a given transaction may be factually connected with a
number of states, each of which could rationally claim sufficient
"nexus" to tax. Since multiple "nexus" claims are no rarity, the
real battleground is at the second of the constitutional barriers-
that posed by the commerce clause.
On its face,' the commerce clause prohibits all state interference
with interstate commercial activity. As a practical matter, however,
the decisions have not attempted to enforce the totality of immunity
expressed in that language. State and local enactments which clear-
ly affect such commerce have frequently been sustained in both
ly, although not frequently. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377
U.S. 436, 442-46 (1964).
'Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
'Brennan, J., in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436,
450 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
"The Congress shall have power... To regulate commerce... among
the several states.... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
(Vol. 43
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regulatory' and tax' spheres. In determining the validity of state
action under the prohibitions of the commerce clause, the Court has
stated a number of very general rules, none of which offer a reli-
able standard of constitutionality against which a litigant may meas-
ure his case. The Court, when faced with problems of state taxation,
has long been torn between conflicting policy considerations: requir-
ing interstate commerce to pay its fair share of the state tax burden'0
and preserving a degree of free trade among the states to which a
tariff barrier of state taxation is inimical." These conflicting
policies have spawned equally conflicting decisions. Stating the
time-honored "direct burdens" test of validity, the Court has said
that the states are not allowed "one single-tax-worth of direct inter-
ference with the free flow of commerce.'- 2 In other cases,' 3 statutes
have been sustained on the grounds that the tax was predicated
upon the "local activity" of the multistate operation, thereby affect-
ing interstate commerce only "indirectly," and not to an unconstitu-
tional degree. To the recurring, formalized question of what
constitutes "local" activity, the Court has never supplied a uniform-
ly applicable answer. 4
During one period' 5 in the recent history of the Court, how-
ever, it appeared that the decisions had finally adopted a reasonable
and workable approach. Under the guidance of Justices Stone and
Rutledge, the Court seemed to abandon the "direct-indirect" test
3E.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179
(1950); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
'E.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938);
Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935).
" See Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252,
259 (1919).
" See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.);
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
1 Freeman v. Hewit, supra note 11, at 256; quoted with approval in
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959).
1 E.g., Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935); Postal Tele-
graph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919); Banker Bros.
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210 (1911).
" See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (dissenting
opinion of Stone, J.). See generally Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1069-74, 1082-
86 (1960).
"' Roughly, the period was the eight years following the decision in West-
ern Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). The reverse
trend was signaled in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
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of tax validity in favor of an approach founded upon the actual
operative impact of the tax in question. Under this theory, assum-
ing sufficient "nexus" to confer jurisdiction, the states were per-
mitted to tax interstate transactions so long as the tax did not
subject the taxpayer to the risk of "multiple" tax burdens not borne
by competing local activity. 6 This approach represented a radical
doctrinal departure from prior decisions. As succinctly put by a
leading writer in the field,
the "direct-indirect" burdens test was predicated on the theory
that a tax on interstate commerce always is invalid. The "mul-
tiple burdens" test, on the other hand, is based on the theory that
a tax on interstate commere is valid if the tax is of such a nature
that the taxed facet of interstate commerce cannot be taxed else-
where, and thus subject interstate commerce to the risk of a
multiple tax burden not borne by local business.'
7
The new rationale offered many advantages over its predecessor.
It attempted to assess the actual economic consequences of the tax
to the taxpayer and to avoid the imposition of commercial disad-
vantage upon him. The old formalism was supplanted by substan-
tive inquiry, providing greater flexibility and ease in application to
"8 See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434
(1939); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 15 (alternative holding). See
generally Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and
an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 1051, 1074-82 (1960); Hartman, Sales Tax-
ation in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. Rxv. 138, 185-90 (1956); Heller-
stein, The Power of Congress to Restrict State Taxation of Interstate Coln-
merce, 12 J. TAXATION 302, 303 (1960). Implicit in the "multiple burdens"
approach is the idea that even though a transaction was clearly taxable in
several states, a tax in one of them was still valid if the tax were properly
apportioned to taxpayer's business activity in the taxing state. See Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947). Thus, for example,
if taxpayer's instate activity relative to a taxed transaction represented 35%
of the total activity expended in the entire transaction, a tax rate based on
35% of gross receipts would be valid. The theory here is, of course, that
fair apportionment removes the risk of tax duplication elsewhere, since each
state will tax only that part of the whole attributable to local activity. It
should be noted that the Washington statute employed as its basis 100%
of gross receipts to General Motors from sales in Washington, and was,
therefore, as the Court pointed out, "unapportioned." 377 U.S. at 448.
" Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an
Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1076 (1960). It is appropriate to note at
this point that Professor Hartman's many excellent contributions to the
literature in this area of tax law are invaluable. His lucid analyses of the
complexities of state taxation problems have been an indispensable source
of aid to this writer.
[Vol. 43
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the cases.' 8 The upshot was that while interstate commerce was
taxed, it paid only its fair share of the burden.
Just as this formula was gaining acceptance, the Court apparent-
ly abandoned it in favor of a return to its previous posture by
reasserting its adherence to the "direct-indirect" test. 9 Even this
turnabout, however, did not dispose of the problem, for the Court
has since vacillated, uttering sometimes the language of the old
test,20 sometimes the language of the new,- " and more often that
of both.22
Amidst a growing clamor for consistency, the present litigation
came before the Court. Arguably, the tax could have been defeated
by due process requirements, since "nexus" is indeed slight where
a taxpayer's contacts with the taxing state are as limited as were
those of General Motors with Washington. But, even having safe-
ly skirted the due process barrier, it would still appear that the tax
must succumb under the more lethal strictures of the commerce
clause, regardless of which test of validity the Court elected to
apply.24 The transactions in question, comprised chiefly of sales
contracts formed in Oregon with f.o.b. deliveries at the Missouri
18 See the opinion of Stone, J., in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S.
34, 43 (1927) (dissenting), in which the Justice vented his ire upon the
"direct-indirect" formula as being too mechanical and remote from actual-
ities. Id. at 44. See generally Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
inerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1081-82 (1960)."' See Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
2 E.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157
(1954); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).21E.g., Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
2 E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959).
" This was one of the grounds upon which Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined
by Justices Stewart and White, dissented from the majority opinion. 377
U.S. at 456. His opinion expressed the view that the decision in Norton Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1950) (which was one of the
cases cited by the majority) "rested solidly on the fact that the taxpayer
had a branch office and warehouse . . ." situated in the taxing state. 377
U.S. at 456. The three Justices found it "difficult... to distinguish between
the in-state activities of the [district managers] . . . and the in-state activi-
ties of solicitors or traveling salesmen. . . ," citing McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth
Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), for the proposition that the activities of the latter
group form an insufficient basis for a levy upon interstate sales. 377 U.S.
at 456. The Norton decision, however, seems to place more emphasis upon
"business activity" than upon the location of the formal office. See Norton
Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra at 539.
"' See Note, 38 WAsH. L. REv. 277, 280-81 (1963), which was written
during the pendency of this litigation before the Supreme Court. Analyzing
the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in this case, it was predicted
that the tax would be struck down under either approach.
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factory, would seem to be clearly interstate in character; and just
as clearly, the gross receipts tax seems to be a "direct burden"
thereon. On the other hand, since the tax was unapportioned and
at least two other states appeared to have a "nexus" claim, there
was an apparent risk of tax multiplication which would be anathema
to the commerce clause under the "multiple burdens" doctrine.
In its opinion, the Court has missed yet another chance to make
a definitive pronouncement in this confused area. Instead, it again
seems to have handed down a hybrid decision." Starting "with
the proposition that '[i] t was not the purpose of the commerce clause
to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just
share of state tax burden . ,'.,"" the Court found it "well estab-
lished that taxation measured by gross receipts is constitutionally
proper if it is fairly apportioned."27 Having thus paid lip service
to the "multiple burdens" concept, the Court proceeded to recognize
that although a state cannot impose a tax on the privilege of engag-
ing in interstate commerce,2" "an in-state activity may be a sufficient
local incident upon which a tax may be based."12  This language is
clearly that of the pre-"multiple burdens" era, and from the philo-
sophical standpoint, it describes an entirely different concept of con-
stitutionality under the commerce clause. Having thus referred to
both tests, the Court does not clearly apply either. Addressing itself
to the problem of whether the gross receipts from sales were fairly
related to General Motors's business activities within the state,80
the Court offered the following:
[The tax] is unapportioned and . . . is, therefore, suspect. We
must determine whether it is so closely related to the local activi-
ties of the corporation as to form "some definite link, some mini-
mum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax."'
1
As discussed above,32 this is the language of the "nexus" test,
customarily used to determine whether, under the due process clause,
25 See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959).
" 377 U.S. at 439, quoting with approval from Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
27 377 U.S. at 440.
2 Id. at 446.
-29 Id. at 447.
30 Id. at 441.
2 Id. at 448.
See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
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-the state has bare jurisdiction to impose any tax. In addition to
applying the test to resolve the jurisdictional question, it seems that
the Court here used "nexus" between the tax and the activity sought
to be taxed as a basis for sustaining, in the absence of apportion-
ment, the measure of the tax. Thus, it has apparently solved the
substantive commerce clause problem of nonapportionment by ap-
plication of the once purely procedural test of due process.
s3
Since the question of apportionment is not pertinent where ap-
plication of the "direct burdens" formula is sought, 4 it may be
that the Court attempted to decide the case by a "multiple burdens"
approach. The opinion, however, casts doubt upon any such con-
* clusion; for, in closing, the Court "refrained from passing on the
question"35 raised by General Motors to the effect that a decision
sustaining the present tax would subject the corporation to multiple
taxation. The reason given was that there had been no affirmative
showing that the transactions had actually been subjected to tax
elsewhere.3" Although this decision is not the first to require a
demonstration of actual tax multiplication, 7 it hardly comports with
the ideas expressed by Mr. Justice Rutledge. To him, the mere
.risk of cumulative burdens was sufficient reason to condemn an un-
apportioned tax." Thus, if the Court employed a "multiple burdens"
test in this case, that test has become quite different from the
original doctrine.
From the foregoing, it seems abundantly clear that, as between
the "direct" and "multiple" burdens approaches, the Court has
adopted or abandoned neither; nor has it really assigned to either
"This is the basis of the dissenting opinion of Brennan, J. 377 U.S. at
449-51.
" See note 16 supra.
"377 U.S. at 449.
"Ibid.
"See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 463 (1959), where such a requirement was imposed in a net income
tax litigation. This requirement is not to be confused with the question of
burdens of proof. State enactments have usually been accorded presumptive
validity, and the general rule applied by the Court has been that the burden
of rebuttal is on the protesting taxpaper. See Norton Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951). But see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S.
249, 253 (1946); Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Sur-
vey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1064-65 (1960).
" "To require factual determination of forbidden effects in each case
would be to invite costly litigation, make decision turn in some cases, per-
haps many, on doubtful facts or conclusions .... ". Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. 249, 279 (1946) (concurring opinion of Rutledge, J.).
" 19641 • 205
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an ascendant position. In short, the Court has yet to offer a de-
pendable guide in this critical area, but has perhaps further confused
the litter upon the commerce clause battleground. It is no doubt
true, as suggested by many writers in the tax field, 9 that problems
of this complexity are more amenable to legislative than to judicial
solution. Hopefully, the solution will not be long in coming; for
if one thing is certain in light of the ever-increasing economic needs
of the states, it is that some consistent guide must be formulated
for the convenience and protection of both states and taxpayers.
It is submitted that the most equitable approach will be found
within the philosophical framework of the "multiple burdens" doc-
trine in tandem with a realistic system of apportionment. As in
other areas of life in this fast-paced world, the efforts expanded
in seeking absolute resolutions of problems will produce a greater
net return if exerted instead in pursuit of equitable compromise.
HENRY STANCILL MANNING, JR.
Corporations-De Facto Corporations-EstoppelModel
Business Corporation Act
Although the submitted articles of incorporation were re-
jected, the defendant nevertheless began doing business as a corpora-
tion. Subsequently, defendant acquired plaintiff's business, giving
the purported corporation's note therefor. Shortly thereafter, arti-
cles of incorporation were issued; but within six months, the cor-
poration failed and was left without assets. Plaintiff, suing on the
note given by the defendant on behalf of the purported corporation,
sought to hold defendant personally liable on the basis that no
corporation had existed at the time of the purchase. Defendant
resisted liability on the grounds that plaintiff had dealt with either
a de facto corporation or a corporation by estoppel. Defendant's
contentions were rejected in Robertson v. Levy,1 which construed
statutory provisions' equivalent to sections 50' and 139" of the
" See, e.g., Braden, Cutting the Gordian Knot of Interstate Taxation, 18
OHIO ST. L.J. 57 (1957); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 1324 (1959). For a view
from the other side of the bench, see the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
476-77 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-921c, -950 (1961).
'Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate
existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be
[Vol. 43
